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1 
The evident inadequacy of orthodox models and tools of nnalysis has, 
in recent decades, led many social scientists to turn to Marxism for T'lnre 
helpful explanations and solutions for the problems of poverty and oppres-
sion in Africa. This is not to say there is complete a~reement among these 
as to the nature and causes of the widespread changes which, over the last 
quarter of a century, have altered the major features of imnerialism in 
Africa: the ways by which transnational corporations continue to ohtai.n 
low-cost raw materials, markets for the surplus manufactures, and extract 
high rates of surplus value from the labors of the more than ,3()0 Milli.on 
people who live there. 
This brief paper accepts that imperialism is inextricably integrated into 
the capitalist political economic system dominated by a relatively few tra.ns-
and banks, 
national corpo:cationei backed by -- though sometimes in conflict .with-- their 
home zgovernments. Their a.sset1S exceed those of any 
- -- --··· -- -- ..... ... ...... -.- ... . _ ... ....,...,'- '''- c:111V 
single African state. In the post World Har II period; these ~lobal giants, 
2 
controlling technology, finance capital, and markets have initiated a funda-
mental redivision of the capitalish world. 
The aim of this paper is to outline the main implications of this on-~oing 
process for the vast continent of Africa. It de3ls with four ~ajor aspec ts: 
1) the impact of the national liberation movements that had, bv the end of the 
.r.h·,1ost (;t) * ~ ~ c.J 
so-called development decade, brought 
" 
indenendence to Cfi\iEt ~l"I"' African nations; 
*'nils paper was pre3ented as one cf four to thejoint plenary session of the 
African Studies Aesoc1at1on and Latin Amer1.can Studies Association in Nover.ber, 
1977. The author wiehes to express appreciation to several. colleagues who 111&de 
useful suggestions, and partiaularly to Sam Bowles. 
**As this paper wa~ assigned as a companion to the one presented by Richard 
Skla?tJ~, no ateempt wae ma.de here to explore as fully as otherwise the 1Mpl1-
ca.t1ons of this analysia for the national class strtiggles and state appar&tus 
on the continent. These are d1gcussed more fully in A. Seid•An, "African Soeial-
fsa and the World Systems Dependency. Transnational Corpora.tions and International 
Debt• to appear inc. Rosberg, Soc1al1ea in Africa (forthco•i~g). 
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2} the factors driving transnational corporations to compete in devising 
new techniques to extract surplus value from the divided politically-
independent African states; 3) the nature of the contradictions that had 
begun to emerge in the late 1950s and 60s; and 4) the implications for 
Africa of the general crisis of capitalism in which these contradictions 
culminated in the 1970s. 
I. The attainment of political independence in Africa: 
After World War II, and especially in the 1960s, Africa became the 
focus of extensive transnational corporate activity in their comp~titive 
scramble to increase their acctunulation and reinvestment of surplus value 
through acquisition of new sources of low cost raw materials and markets 
for their ever-expanding out put of manufactured ~oods. Many factors un-
doubtedly influenced . this re-newed interest. The fact that a third of the 
world had shifted into the socialis.t camp, severely curtailing the freedom 
of transnational corporate maneuvers, was undoubtedly a consideration. The 
prolonged war ~d ultimate victory of the Vietnam people further emphasized 
that large areas of the world were no longer simply available for corporate 
pickings. 
The balkanized states of Africa, in contrast, in a continent three times 
the size of the United States, constituted an extensive underdeveloped region 
where transnational corporations still had hopes of finding some sort of 
welcome. Valuab.le mineral and tropical produce are known to be available in 
vast, though not fully determined, quantities. The market potential of the' 
high income elites among the more than 300 million Africans, _despite their 
overall low average incomes, is not inconsiderable ~ though tiny coapared to that 
of devel~ped regiona. 
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The winds of change that swept southward across the African continent 
after World War II, culminating in the independence of over 40 African 
states, did, however, alter the context within which transnational corpor-
ations could conduct their activities there in their search to maximize 
their global profits. Gone was the protective wnbrella of direct colonial 
y\ ' t '~ . t ~. r L 
rule and militacy ·-mi~ which had in past ,., decades enabled European 
settlers to exptopriate the best lands for spreading agricultural estates 
in East Central and Southern Africa, and granted vast mining concessions, 
trading and financial control to a handful of giant colonial firms through-
out the continent. 
Only a handful of African nations, however, have begun to take the 
essential first steps to initiate the process of transformation of their 
political economies towards · socialism. These few have proclaimed their 
goal to be to reorganize inherited institutions to capture and d.irect domes-
tically produced surpluses to investments in new industries and agriculture 
t6 provide increased productive employment and higher levels of living for 
the majority of their peoples. Gradually, they have begun to exert control 
over the 'commanding heights' : export- import and internal wholesale trade, 
banking and finance, and, insofar as they exist, basic industries. 
These new nations have not found it easy to carry through the transition 
to socialism in the conditions of underdevelopment 1mposed in Africa by more 
4 
than a century of colonial rule. They have encountered difficulties in 
. 
mo~lizing and uniting the masses of working people, peasantry and intellec~uals 
behind clear-cut ideological perspectives. Their room for maneuver has been 
severely hampered by the fragile, externally-dependent character of their 
inherited political-economic structures. They have lacked skilled cadres 
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capable of exercising effective control over critical institutions. All 
these factors have hindered their ability to deal effectively with the 
transnational corporations and western governments which have employed 
the full gamut of available strategies and tactics to block their progress. 
Among the African states which still may be included in the roster 
of those seeking to build socialism are Guinea, Algeria and Tanzania and 
Somalia -- although there are those who, pointing to the inevitable internal 
contradictions and incipient class conflicts, argue that one or another of 
5 
these, too, should be struck from the list. Irt the_ last two years, the 
former Portuguese colonies, Guniea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique, haying 
attained political independence after a decade of guerilla warfare, have 
0... 01 e'(')\tl 
..._. declared their determination to pursue~ Marxist-Leninist path of 
socialist transformation. 
The majority of the politically-divided African states, in contrast, 
have accepted the traditional Westerh argument that foreign investment and 
production for export are the keys to development. They have made little 
effort to restructure the inherited political-economic institutions that 
chain their export-oriented economies into the capitalist world commercial 
6 
system. Their independence has been accompanied, instead, by the rapid 
emergence of what has come to be termed the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie': 
civil servants and leading politicians who use .their new-found power over 
the machinery of state to enhance their own economic and political status . 
. 
In some instances, like Ivory Coast and Kenya, they proclaim their aim 
to build private enterprise, and unabashedly welcome transnational corporate 
investment. They have multiplied state expenditures to build infrastructure, 
-5-
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nurture a 'hospitable investment climate, and maintain law and order 
to guarantee the status quo. They have created dome.stic allies for 
transnational firms by 'Africanizing' government and local businesses, 
arrogating to themselves and their cronies the juiciest public and pri-
vate sector plums. Some have insisted on being allowed to particippte as 
private shareholders and even local directors in transnational corporate 
branches and subsiaries. 
In other countries, like Nigeria, Zaire and Zambia, the newly installed 
governments have gone further in pursuing . more directly interventionist 
capitalist policies. Governments themselves have purchased major shares of 
ownership of transnational corporate branches and subsidiaries. Here the 
members of the emergent 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' has assumed managerial 
t_using_) ~
fW\ctions, /government capital and influence t~ themselve~ as gov-
ernment representatives on boards of directors and/or managements. They 
pay themselves enormous salaries in addition to acquiring innumberable 
'perks' and benftfits. Widespread corruption has become notorious. 
The governments of those new Africart states which have welcomed 
transnational corporate investment have not, .however, enjoyed harmony or 
stability. The rising expectations of the masses of their populations, gen-
erated in part by the attainment of independence and their own unfulfilled 
promises, have remained unsatisfied. So-called 'tribal' and other conflicts 
have emerged as different factions of the bureaucratic and would-be bureau-
cratic bourgeoisie have bickered over the crumbs falling from the transnatfonal 
· . ' ' . .L : I. I ' LI _j 
.1 · .. · ; · ·: '.,'. (~1,eYJ e,ve r t:i 1.-ce:T•'1· 
corporate table. In a number of countries, the military has 94!cpfcd ~~. The 
generals typically pledge to end corruption and establish 'fair and just' 
rule. With few exceptions, they too have quickly succumbed to the insti-
tutionalized pressures to pursue policies conducive to the continued pro-
fitable operation of transnational enterprise. 
-6-
II. Transnational corporate competition in Africa: 
The transnational corporate interests and banks are not, as some 
8 
, 
critics appear to suggest, monolithically united in their efforts to 
extract surplus value from Africa. The giant firms may sometimes combine 
in temporary alliances, consortia, etc., to expand into new areas ·of raw 
materials or markets; but these alliances may break down when more powerful 
transnational corporations seek once again to expand at others' expense. 
New alliances may be established on a new level, but these break down as 
new circcmstances arise. 
This competition has been aggravated by uneven development among core 
industrial nations as capital accumulation and technological advance has 
altered the international division of labor and spµrred new efforts to expand 
transnational corporate footholds in Africa. Th 0 se transnationals based in 
nations which, b~cause of historical circumstances, have greater access to 
growing a.ccumulations of capi.tal and adaptive research capacity, were able 
to incorporate .the most modern technological advances into their rapidly 
growing home-based industrial plant. This had two consequences. On the 
one hand, it le~ to the iricreased organic composition of capital and a falling 
rate of profit in all developed capitalist countries, contributing to the 
pressures influencing transnationals to seek new sources of more profitable 
investment abroad. On the other, it gave the more successful an edge in the 
.... _ 
renewed competative scramble for expansion in Africa. , ---~·---'"-· - · · := = ='-- - ~-- ..:::mlL.~I 
The United States, with 1ta factories, advanced technological 1aputa~ 
aa4 T&st aeeuaulationa 
funds available for reinvestment, initally dominated the capitalist world 
9 10 
world after World War II. Germany and Japan, only tempor~rily set back by 
military defeat, employed vigorous state capitalist action, as well as bene-
fitting from financial assist~ce from U.S. governmental and corporate circles, 
· · (and without •111tary claiae ea their accuaulation resources} 
~--~--.~-_.,.,_.....- ..-. ... • - • - - • · - ·· · -- · - .. - "'T _ _ _ _ ••• ---
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to rebuild and expand the institutional and technological foundations of 
their own global corporate enterprise. Transnational corporations in all 
three invested heavily in building up the technological foundations of 
industries in their home economies. In particular, they introduced new 
techniques includiag automation as they expanded thebasic machinery and 
equipment output of their heavy industries (what Marx termed Department). 
I). They sought new sources of low cost raw materials in Africa. As their 
output of manufactured goods expanded, they sought new markets, increasingly 
not only for their light consumer goods exports, but also for basic machinery 
. ; • 1 '\.- I ~ I 4 .,.. ~ • - L<° 1 
1."' .::~: - -~~ '? -~
and equipment. u.s. based transnationals, seeking to find lower J_and 
tax areas for labor intensive light industries 9 moved entire plants to places 
like Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore. The transnational cor-
porations based in all three countries began to take advantage of the newly-
acquired political independence of African states to penetrate British and 
French spheres of influence from which they had previously been excluded by 
colonial _rule. . 
Transnational banks have played an invaluable role in facilitating this 
penetration proc~ss. Two U.S. banks, Citicorp and Chase Manhatten (both 
central to the Rockefeller orbit) have been important in providing financial 
and technical assistance for the post-'independence expansion of U.S. trans-
national corporations in Africa. Most of th~ larger U.S. firms with invest-
11 
ments in Africa are represented on their boards of directors. To assist 
their corporate -partner-clients, these banks have opened branches, subsidi~ries 
and representative offices, not only in Europe, but also in those African 
countries offering them free rein: South Africa, Liberia, . M crocco, Zaire, 
12 
Nigeria, Ivory Coast and, more recently, Egypt. They have bought up shares 
in two of the 'big three' British banks that have for so many decades dominated 
-8-
English-speaking Africa: Citicorp owns 49 percent of the shares of National 
13 
Grindlays, Chase Manhatten purchased 15 percent of, the shares of the Standard · 
Bank. It later exchanged these for a significarit olock of shares in the Hritish 
* 14 
Midlands Bank. It claims to have sold the latter. The extent of its cur-
rent linkages to British banks remains shrouded in the kind of secrecy so 
15 
treasured by the world of high finance. Citicorp also owns 40 percent of 
16 
the shares of the French Banque de l'Afrique Occidentale, one of the two big 
French banks in West Africa during the colonial era. 'l'hese banks help the 
· transnational corporations to make contacts and arrange consortia for their 
expanding investments. 
The West German banks are much more closely ktlit with West German-based 
s~~ ~~.-r p ~11:d··c.;r-y<J 
transnational corporations and even pnas•e:tals through outright shareholdin~s 
in addition to interlocking directorships than is legally permitted in the U.S. 
In recent years, the West German banks have begun to plav an aggressive role 
in facilitating the extension of its affiliated industrial and trading interests 
, 17 
in Africa, espe~ially in South Africa. (see below) The transnational corpor-
ations have begun to compete increasingly intensely in particular regional 
centers of Africa, aggravating the uneven pattern of development and t.mderdev~ 
elopment initiated furing the colonial era. They quickly discovered thev 
18 
could continue in this context to attain their old goals bv new techniqties. Now 
4> 
they may expect the independent African governments to help fin~nce infrastructure 
* The U.S. Federal Trade Commission insisted that Chase sell its shares 
of Standard when the latter began to open branches inside the U.S.: U.S. banks 
may, under U.S. law, buy shares of foreign hanks with whon .thev are supposedlv 
in competition, hut not if those hanks operate in the U.S. itself. 
-9-
and sometimes even provide additional capital to produce essential raw 
materals to be shipped to their core nation industries. Transnationals 
can expand their hold on local African markets for manufactured goods by 
building last stage assembly and processing plants, importing parts and 
materials to produce high-priced, tariff-protected luxury and semi-luxury 
items for narrow high income groups. They sti}l control the banking and 
financial sectors, retaining predominant influence over the direction of 
domestic credit and monetary policies. Government ownership of some shares 
and representation by members of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie on boards 
of directors of local bank branches or subsidiaries does little to alter 
the basic control of managerial decisions by transnational corporations. 
In short, the direct siphoning out of surplus value in the form of 
initially 
profits, interest and dividends continues. In some cases it has been/dis-
guised in the form of managerial and licensing fees, or as compensation for 
( yV r'd\•"' <;. ~ 6(_j 
goverruilentl shares of ownership. I' 
items, together, still totalled 
In Zambia, for example, by 1973, these 
l HI v; t fnl.~ <.J'MJ~ ) 
about a sixth of the natiortal product, 1allllost 
19 I-< , 
a third of the country's total foreign exchange earnings. 
Official U.S. data shows that, by the end of the 1960s, despite the, rapid 
post-independence expanision of direct U.S. investment in Africa, more capital 
was shipped out of that continent, year by year, (except in 1968) by U.S. 
transnationals in the form of direct extraction of surplus value than was 
it ne.+-
being invested tn it. This/illustrated by Table 1. Thefamount of surplus 
value shipped out of Africa (excluding South Africa) by U.S. transnational ! 
corporations with direct investments there over the ten year period, 1965 
to 1975, was $2,998 million• This exceeds the total of a~l reported direct 
investments made by U.S. firms there over the years, $2,397 million. In other 
Year 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 . 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
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Table 1: Surplus value extracted directly from African countries, 
excluding South Africa, from 1965 to 1975, by U.S. based 
transnational corporations. 
Direct New U.S. investments 
in Africa, excluding South 
Africa (in $ millions) 
$171 
83 
135 
374 
246 
387 
255 
138 
-625 
-143 
164 
U.S. transnational 
corporations' ex-
traction of surplus 
value (1) ($ millions) 
-$249 
-270 
-284 
-207 
-616 
-610 
-481 
-410 
-466 
-799 
-356 
Amount by which 
surplus value" 
extracted ex-
ceeds new direct 
· iDves tmen t 
~~ millions) 
-$78 
-187 
-1149 
(167) 
-370 
- ·223 
-262 
-272 
-466(2) 
-799(2) 
-192 
Total, 1965-1975 ' . $2,998 
llfotees {1) It 1s. difficult to obtain an accurate estimate of surplus 
value directly extracted for several reasons. This is 
intended to provide only an ind1.cation of the order of mag-
nl tude. It is tt:f 111ui1111lltd~ underestimated, since it ls 
based on official reportg to the U.S. Government by trans-
national corporations of theifnterest, dividends, branch 
earnings. It dies not include managerial and licensing 
f aes or compeneation for government purchases of shares of 
ownership, which, in recent years, have become increasingly . 
i1tportant foma of direct extraction of gurplus value. · 
(2) In 1973 and 1974, there was a decline in total investment, 
Source: 
- ---- . ._.., ______ _,.- ...... -· . 
or a disinvestment. If this was added to the reported sur-
plus value shipoed out the totals would be much higher in 
those years, $1,091 million and $942 million, respectively. 
Calculated from U.S. Bureau of Census, The .Statistical Abstract 
of the U.S. table entitled "U .s. Direct Investment Abroad -
Direct Investment Position and Balance of Payments Income, By 
Country11 (Washington D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
for years indicated). 
,-. 
tended 
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words, in one decade, the U.S. transnational corporations took out of Africa 
(excluding South Africa) in the form of direct extraction of surplus value 
$601 million, that is, about 25 percent more than they ls& 1 u invested there! 
It should be emphasized that the data given in Table 1 is only that relating 
to for interest, dividends and branch earnings as reported by the' transnational 
corporations to the U.S. authorities. It does not include managerial fees, 
licensing fees, or compensation for government ownership of shares in trans-
national corporate projects. Nor does it 
othet forms in which surplus value may be 
ta th• U.S. Goverrtment. 
include depreciation allowances or I 
concealed to avoid payment of taxes' 
ftje1r control of world markets enables thea to hold prices tor enide exports 
they buy from partially or wholly government-owned firms at relatively low 
levels, enabling them to realize the surplus value . when they sell the produce 
at higher prices to final consumers. In this connection, they have 1noreasiagly 
to leave investment in the actual production of raw materials exports to Africans, 
20 • 
themselves. Even before independence, African farmers, in addition to European-
owned settler 'estates, were beginning to be encouraged to expand their output of 
export crops. The African peasant, orthdoxy now explains, may be expected to 
. *21 
behave in accord with the imported capitalist model of 'economic man', 
increasing output in response to economic incentives created by government 
provision of infrastructure, inputs, and marketing facilities. Transnational 
firms have been content to leave the ownership of land and even local mark~ting 
arrangements in the hands of peasants -- usually the larger African farmers 
backed by local governments. They are free to purchase agricultural crops 
* Since many African peasants engaged in the production of foodstuff 
are in fact women, this assertion appears to be doubly culture-bound! 
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planted and harvested by African farmers, playing those of one country off 
against another, or even against peasants in other 'third world' areas. They 
may buy coffee, for example, from Kenya, Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania, 
or Angola -- or any one of the 18 Latin American countries whose national ec-
onomies have for generaltions been geared to the sale of coffee to overseas 
' 
marts. They may buy .cocoa from Ghana, Nigeria, Togo or Ivory Coast -- or from 
Brazil, Ecuador or other tropical Latin American or Asian lands which may be 
enticed to produce it. The peasants hear the risk. ntey till the land and 
invest their meager savings to expand their output. If 'oversupply' · forces 
down prices on the world market, it is they who suffer. The transnational 
companies reap even higher profits from the next stages of marketing and pro-
ceasing their crops for sale at high prices abroad. 
Since African countries have attained independence, transnationals, after 
initial resistance, actually began to welco~e governmental action to purchase 
shares of ownership of the mines. They have discovered they may rely on their 
control of man~gement. international marketing, and financial arrangements to 
extract surplus value :indirectly in forms tnore like those they had earlier in-
traduced in their agricultural dealings. When the African governments invest 
in expansion of mineral production, their interests are increasingly tied to 
those of the companies. If they cannot hold prices down by reducing costs --
* including local taxes and the wages of the workers, the companies may shift 
their mineral purchases to other countries where conditions are more 'favorable' 
to their global profit maximizing considerations. 
* About half the wages bill goes to the 10 percent of.the mine force which 
constitutes supervisory and managerial personnel; but efforts to hold wages down 
are typically directed not against this small group -- who, it is said, must be 
paid high salaries or they will leave -- but the majority of the mine workers 
whose wages -- through of ten exceeding those of other workers -- are little 
above subsistence level. 
... 
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The postwar growth and competition of transnational corporate enter-
prise differentially affected the economic growth pattenis of newly-indep-
endent nations of Africa for technical reasons. The demand for some Africa~-
produced crude materials by European and North American factories ha.q been 
22 
sharply reduced by the introduction of new technologies. Nylon ,, polyesther 
and rayon fibres, for example, have been substituted for African-grown cotton 
and sisal. Aluminum and even plastics began to replace copper when its price 
shot up in a temporary boom in the later '60s. Processes designed to reduce 
industrial waste like the recycling of scrap to produce 40 percent of indus-
trial countries' copper requirements, further reduced demand for some crude 
exports. African countries, whose political economies had been shaped tmder 
colonialism to depend on the sale of these materials, suffered sharp reductions 
in their foreign exchange eaniings. 
The demand for other raw materials, especially minerals, like oil and 
urani'ilm, in contrast, expanded rapidly. This permitted some third world coun-
tries to join transnational rirtns in utilizing cartel~like techniques, at least 
temporarily, to p~ess for higher prices, and capture a share of the resulting 
profits for themselves. !n the '70s, oil in particular bestowed an economic 
boom on a few African cotmtries, like Algeria, Libya and Nigeria. The Western 
press obscures the fact,however, that, while OPEC countries have temporarily 
benefitted from high oil prices, the major oil companies have reaped record 
23 
profits through their oligopolistic control over the world market. In the 
longer rtm, as substitutes are introduced, or new sources of oil are discovered, 
the ability of member countries of OPEC to continue to benefit from high prices 
* 
will be sharply reduced. 
*The' oil companies have invested much of their.profits in buying up al-
ternative energy sources, as well as investing in new oil wells outside of the 
OPEC nations. 
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The rapid post-independence growth of 'modern' export enclaves under the 
stimulus of growing transnational corporate demand for particular commodities 
at particular times has led to further underdevelopment of neglected hinter-
lands in African states. Rural-urban migration has .been aggravated, contri-
buting to a growing unemployed labor reserve and political unrest in the cities. 
As Zani>ia's Government invested in expanded copper output to take advantage of 
the temporary copper boom of the 1960s, for example, continuing neglect of 
productive activities on the countryside despite official rhetoric deploring 
it -- caused the urban drift to swell to a flood. In a few short years, the 
population in the cities has jumped from 25 to 40 percent of the nation's in-
24 
habitants. Over half of them are crowded into squatter compounds without 
piped water supplies, electricity, or sewerage. In Nigeria, the post-~ivil 
wa,,..oil-boom has been accompanied by an ever-increasing dependence on imported 
foodstuffs not only for a newly rich, but also for the swelling urban popula-
tions crushed into shanty-towns on the outskirts of every city. 
The consequences of continued and increased indirect extraction of surpluses , 
became evident as the terms of trade of Afritan and other third world countries 
worsened in the '50s and '609. Nations in which African peasants themselves are 
the primary producers, selling their produce to transnational trading firms 
which handle the marketing and processing abroad, were beginning to feel the 
negative effects by the early '60s. From 1955 to 1965, for example the price 
of cocoa tumbled from ~500 to ~90 a ton. The real income of the Ghanaian peasaht 
in the latter year was below that of the Great Depression of the '30s; and the 
Ghanaian economy, having doubled its out put of cocoa during the decade, was in 
desperate straits~ By the beginning of the '70s, mineral producing countries, where 
governments had purchased major shares of the mines, too, confronted falling 
mineral prices, rising import costs, and worsening balanc~ of payments deficits. 
* When the big companies themselves owned the mines, they cut back pro-
duction to hold prices up, throwing the burden of unemployment and reduced 
revenues directly on the population. 
*25 
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Most African states sought to attract forei~ capital to invest in 
, 
manufacturing industry to increase productive employment opportunities for 
the growing numbers of urban unemployed. The transnational firms have, 
however, typically invested only in last stage assembly and processing 
industries. Taking advantage of the governments' efforts to stimulate 
local production by providing 'tax holidays' and imposing tariffs to exclude 
competitors, the transnationals import capital-intensive machinery and 
equipment from their factories back home. They continue to import parts 
and materials to be processed locally for sale under a 'made-in-X-African-
state' label. They provide few local jobs. They hinder the development of 
local resources. They ensure continued external dependence of local economies 
on imported parts and materials, providing expanding markets for their own 
26 
technologically-advanced home-based ind tis tries. 
They commonly 'overinvoice' imported manufactured parts and materials as 
well as finished goods to conceal the process of trans.ferring untaxed surpluses 
27 
out of the country. In . the process, they seek always to maximize their 
global returns, transferring their profits by devious accounting techniques 
to whatever locations require them to pay the lowest taxes and permit them 
adequate flexibility to reinvest for the highest rates of further accwnulation. 
Even this type of limited manufacturing investment tends to be concentrated 
ir. a few favored nations, where the bureaucratic bourgeoisie provides them 
with the most 'hospitable investment climate'. There the transnationals 
concentrate their narrow range of capital and technology in the developed urban 
28 
areas, aggravating the characteristics of national development/underdevelopment: 
in Lagos, Port Harcourt, Ibadan and Kano in Nigeria; in Abidjan in Ivory Coast; 
in Nairobi and Mobassa in Kenya; in Kishasa and Lubumbashi in Zair~ along the 
line-of-rail in Zambia. 
(, 
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Their activities foster the emergence of these limited areas as incipient 
sub-centers in the regional peripheries. It looks as though, in the 1970s, 
Egypt may become another of these more favored na~ions. 
Most successful in the competitive struggle to attract transnational 
corporate manufacturing investment, however, has been, not any of , the newly 
independent African countries, but South Africa. Foreign investment and 
technology has played a primary role in building up the South African military• 
industrial complex as · the most significant regional sub-center at the expense 
of the neighboring underdeveloped political economies and peoples in the entire 
Southern African peripheral region. 
South Africa, governed by an out-and-out racist state capitalist regime, 
has promised a profitable welcome for transnational corporations, backed by 
29 
a well-cultivated myth of invincable stability. The systematic enforcement 
of apartheid has . coerc:ed the Africans -- 80 percent of the population -- to 
live in grossly underdeveloped, impoverished 1 Bati.tustans' (so-called 'homelands') 
on the least f~rtile 13 percent of the national land area. These are explicitly 
designed as labor reserves for women, children, old meri, and unemployed. Their 
30 
desperate poverty and chronic malnutrition are well-documented. Able-bodied 
men. are permitted to migrate to seek work for below-poverty-line wages in the 
industralized 'white' areas only when white-owned factories-farms-mines re-
quire their labor power for profitable production. The wages they receive 
are consciously set at less than the bare minimum argued by Marx as .essential 
under capitalism, that is the socially necessary wage required to support the 
worker and his family to ensure the creation of the next generation of labor 
power. In South Africa wives and children are expected to.support themselves 
by agriculture - even though three fourth of the Bantustan populations have 
no land of their own! 
\_ 
Source 
ltlropean 
Econoaio 
Ooa-1 n1 t.J' 
'!ot&l 
lan4 
~ 
Share ?f 
1.ansblent 
to tohl 
innirt.eent 
(Per cent) 
eountriea ' 6d5 67.6 
Rest of 
Europe 
Borth and 
South 
'57 6.5 
Allerica · 1 2°' 22.1 
Africa 
.Uia 
Oce&ni.6 
'fot&].CZJ 
1111 
28 
2.1 
0.5 
6o 1 • .1 
5 449 100.0 
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Table 4. Boa.th Af'lrica: stock or direct inveat~nt in the private sector 
b;r categorz or ecoIJClllic activity and by source, end or 197' 
(MillioM or ranch (R)) 
liDADCe 
inaurance 
Agriculture Vbolenle Transport real estate 
· toreat17 Kining + ,. retail storage + + budneH 
+ fhhing q11&1"l71ns Man4f'aotur1ng Oonrrf" . ·11ai;~... ;..clM&-. COllllWlicatfoll aarvi.:es other 
R I R s B ' ~ -f.-_ - R I R I R I R 1 
25 59.5 256 6o.9 l 590 64.7 48 . 78.7 
2 4.8 6 1.4 
6 14., 157 ,7.4 
7 16.7 1 0.2 
2 4.8 
le2 100.0 Ji2o 100.0 
213 8.7 11 J.8.o 
6o8 24.7 1 1.6 
ll o.4 
' 
0.1 
,1 1., 
2 456 100.0 
1 . ..l..6 
61 100.0 . 
4T1 59.8 
68 8.5 
2,.. 29., 
17 
l 
2.1. 
0.1 
l. 0.1 
796 . 100.0 
75 66.8 
27 24.8, 
6 
l 
5.5 
0.9 
109 100.0 
l 17' 78.8 4 ,, ... 
51 , ... 6 . 8.1 
154 io., J.8 2i.., 
5.4 
4.1 
66 4.G 
17 1.1 
26 l· ·r 
1 489 100.0 
4 
' 2 2.7 
~ 100.0 
Source: United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, based on South African Reserve Bank, The Second 
Census of Foreign Transactions, Liabilities and Assets, 31 December 1973; Supplement to the South African Reserve 
Bank Quarterly Bulletin, March 1976. 
l.. {l) Total includes R2 000 not allocated ~o any region. 
.... . ) 
l2) Directly-held investments include only ·those with more than half the shares in local branches and subsidiaries. 
This constituted about half the total foreign investment. 
" , 
,  
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Unlike their investments in the limited manufacturing sectors of in-
dependent African states, in South Africa the transnationals have helped 
to build an integrated industrial complex characterized by an increasing 
degree of technological self-sufficiency. There is nothing like a 'free 
market' in South African manufacturing industry, anymore than in 8;11Y other 
33 
sector of that capitalist, state-controlled economy. The South African 
Government has intervened directly through a series of parastatals, especially 
in basic industries -- iron and steel, chemicals, oil, electricity -- to ensure 
that proposed industrial expansion has taken plac~. Beyond this; a complex 
set of import controls require increased local production of parts and 
materials for industrial products. Automobiles must now be almost entirely 
locally produced. 
The South African government has taken advantage of the growing competition 
among transnational corporations to encourage them to invest more and more · 
34 
heavily in recertt years. British firms were ther~ first, based on a long 
· relationship dating back to the pre-1910 colonial era. In manufacturirtg, 
British firms have been inv~lved in iron and steel, auto, chemicals and oil, 
as well as a range of light ~onsumer goods industries. British firms are so 
interlinked with the private firms that constitute their South African counter-
parts that, in many cases, it is almost impossible to disentangle them. A 
number of British firms with investments in South African manufacturing industry 
became in part or entirely owned by the British Government as a result of post-
war nationalizations. These include British Leyland, producing autos and trucks; 
Shell-BP which owns a critical South African oil refinery; and several British 
steel companies. 
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U.S. firms have multiplied their investments in South African manufacuring 
35 
in the last decade and a half. They directly own , about a fifth of all for-
eign investment and about a fourth of all foreign manufacturing investment in 
South Africa. . They have invested fou~ out of five of the dollars they have 
devoted to manufacturing on the entire continent in South African ,factories. 
Through partial ownership of transnational corporations based in England, 
West Germany, and France, they have additional, but unknown amounts of in-
direct investment in South African industry. They also own minority shares 
in South African manufacturing firms which are difficult to identify. 
U.S.-based transnationals play a major role in South African auto, 
electrical equipment and appliances, computers, rubber and oii industries. 
They are engaged in other light industries, as well. They are making a major 
contribution to building up the more technologically advanced equipment aud 
machinery of the South African economy -- and, incidentaliy, the South African 
military machine. The U.S. Government, through the Atoms for Peace Program, 
as well as private U.S. firms, have helped South Airica to acquire the tech-
nological capacity needed to produce nuclear power and, it is widely believed, 
nuclear weapons by 1980. 
J~panese transnational corporations have, in the last decade, become 
important buyers of South Africa's mineral exports, taking over half of South 
African iron ore exports and an important share of its coal. The Japanese 
Government prohibits Japanese firms from investing directly in South Africa. 
U.S. companies, which own shares in Japanese firms, therefore ship Japanese~ 
made parts and equipment to their South African factories for assembly and 
sale inside South African tariff barriers, as well as abro~d. Chrysler and 
General Motors, for example, produce small Japanese cars and trucks in their 
South African plants, since they seem to sell better than the big U.S. models 
·' 
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Reports indicate that South African-based plants plan to sell about $1.5 
*35a 
million of their output of Japanese car products in the U.S. itself. 
West Germany, too, has expanded its trade with. South Africa rapidly. 
It has become that country's most important trading partner in recent years. 
It buys South African mineral exports in exchange for heavy industrial equip-
ment and machinery. West German-based transnationals have simul~aneously 
expanded their investments there, especially in basic manufacturing industries. 
Over the last fifteen years, they have played a crucial role in building up 
South Africa's iron and steel, chemicals, and electrical appliances industry. 
lbey, too, have contributed to nuclear power development. 
lbe French Government has collaborated with French companies in expanding 
their role in South Africa, although they provide only about five percent of 
foreign investments there. When the U.N. sought to embargo military sales to 
the•racist regime, the French Government permitted French firms to continue 
... .. .. 
to sell their military plaries and weapons and, in recent years, to license 
production of French military models. The French firm, Framatome, won the 
international competition to build South Africa's largest nuclear power 
installation. The U.S. transnational, Westinghouse, .owns 15 percent of Framatome, 
and had supplied it with much of its basic nuclear technology. 
In sum, the transnational corporations are engaged in an increasingly 
competitive struggle to expand their footholds in Africa as a continuing 
source of raw materials, markets, and profits. Uneven development in the 
* 
. Gas is scarce and expensive in South Africa which must import its 
entire supply aside from the 10 percent of its requirements produced by 
its oil-from-coal process, contributed by U.S. transnational oil firms. 
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capitalist core countries has given U.S., West Germany and to a lesser 
extent Japan, an edge in breaking into the former British and French 
' 
spheres of influence as African nations have attained political independence. 
At the same time, their competitive efforts have aggravated uneven develop-
ment in Africa, itself, contributing to a new international division of labor 
with the emergence of sub-centers through which they seek to dominate entire 
regions of the periphery. Despite the African nations' competitive efforts 
to attract foreign capital, however, South Africa's racist state capitalist 
regime appeared· to have provided the most 'attractive investment climate'. 
It is there that, over the last decade and a half, transnational firms have 
concentrated their investments to build up a vertically integrated and in-
creasingly self-sufficient industrial-military complex from which their local 
manufacturing plants and branch offices could penetrate the southern third 
of the continent. 
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III. Growing contradictions: 
The transnational corporations' competitive e~fort to accumulate more 
surplus value from Africa was, of course, only on~ aspect of their larger 
endeavors to maximize profits on a global scale, not only from their activi-
ties in other third world countries, but from workers in their hoµie-based 
* industries as well. By the 1960s, these appeared to be shaping a new inter-
national division of labor in which sub-regional cente·rs like South Africa 
were beginning to play a crucial role in facilitating the direct and indirect 
expropriation of surplus value from entire peripheral regions. This process 
inevitably gave rise to a series of growing interacting contradictions whose 
impact spread throughout the capitalist world. 
The augmentation of surplus value extracted directly and indirectly from 
Africa and other third world nations only partially of fse~the fall in the 
rate of profit resulting from the rising organic composition of capital in 
the core industrial countries. The continuing acctnilulation and reinvestmenj: 
• 
Thie proposition is in direct artd intended conflict with A. 
Emmanuel's proposition that workers of the 'rich' nations, by demanding 
' I I higher wages, are participating in exploiting those from poor nations 
in a process of 'unequal exchange'. It is difficult to see how anyone, 
using historical materialist tools of .analysis can accept his argument. 
It is precisely his inadequate analysis of the ways irt which transnational 
corporations extract surplus value directly and indirectly from third 
world countries that leads him to the startlingly distorted conclusion 
that the demands of the working class "become the driving force ·of the 
world economic antagonism, a~~6 international worke.rs' solidarity becomes 
an historical misconception. See, below, a. d1scuss1oa of t~e 
way trananationale contribute to creatioa of the 'labor ariatoerac7.' (p. 27) 
.. -
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of 'surplus value by the transnationals led to ever 37 more advanced levels of 
technology, still further increasing the organic i i compos t on of capital in 
the home base economies, expanding the t 1 
ota prod~ction of manufactured goods, 
including basic machinery and equipment, ~hi. ch b ~ must e sold by the core in- ~ 
dustrial nations. Simultaneously, the process continuously d narrowe down the 
avaiable markets, both at home and 
overseas, in which this expanded output 
could be sold. 
The continual extraction of ~urplus value from third world cotmtries, in-
tiuding Africa~ intensified balanc~ of payment problems and forced their 
governments to take measures to reduc~ imports. 
Orthodox arguments as to the comparative advantages to be won through free 
trade, and, more recently, analyses purporting to show the high costs of ef-
fective tariff rates proved unconvincing. Government after government in 
Africa, and elsewhere, faced by growing balance of . trade and payroents deficits 
arld mounting international debts, raised tariffs further and tightened exchange 
controls in an attempt to reduce the imports of manufactured goods. Often 
acting on agvice and even under pressure from the International Monetary 
Fund, they devalued their currencies. These measures were incapable, however, 
of eliminating the source of their problems, the institutionalized techniques 
through which the transnational corporations extracted surplus value from their 
externally dependent economies. On the contraryf they tended to reduce the real 
levels of living of the national populations. Simultaneously they effectively further 
narrowed the potential markets for the continually expanding output of manu-
factured goods produced by transnational corporations in their home-hased 
38 
factories as well as those in major regional sub-centers like South Africa. 
The relative narrowing of markets and the shifting in;ernational division 
of labor was reflected in. and interacted with conditions which merged in the 
transnational corporations' home-base economies as well as the newly emergent 
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regional sub-centers like South Africa. A series of recessions occurred in 
the post World War II period. On the surface, these appeared to be partial 
and localized. The nations affected apparently recovered quickly, encouraging 
the orthodox to sing the praises of the 'Kenyesian revolution' which, they 
claimed, had forever banished the dangers of more serious economic crisis. 
Underneath, however, the effect of the continuing accumulation and re-
investment of surplus value was reflected not only in the rising organic 
composition of capital, but also in the changing structure of employment .in 
the core industrial nations. Increasing numbers of workers were employed 
in the services, financial and distributive activities, drawing heavily on 
the extensive labor reserve of lower-paid fem~le workers. Blue collar em-
ployment, in contrast, was declining in relative terms as a result of auto..: 
39 
mation ~ and the shifting of entire plants overseas. 
In the United States, still the dominant capi~alist nation, the officially 
*40 
reported trends of unemployment continued to increase. Traditional economists 
attd businessmen so1Jght to 'explain' this as a reserve to ensure flexibility of 
the labor fore~ in the fluctuating conditions of a rapidly growing market 
41 
economy. Some asserted that it reflected the unwonted entry of women into 
the labor force -- ignoring the fact that most women took the low paid, rela-
42 
tively unskilled jobs available to them only out of necessity. The recorded 
participation of males in the U.S. labor force, especially among minorities 
* 43 
These were widely criticized as understated. If part-time and 
discouraged workers were included, especially among minorities and women, 
the rates would be nearly double those officially reported. 
- , -
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and .unskilled workers, declined significantly, suggesting the permanent 
withdrawal of those discouraged by low wages and continued rebuffs in the 
44 
job market. This phenomenon was widely ignored: 
In South Africa, the Government took the easier path of s ·imply not 
record~ng statistics concerning unemployment among the African wo~kers. 
This accorded with the mythology that Africans without jobs could simply re-
turn to their 'traditional lives' in the Bantustans, despite reports of growing 
unemployment and hunger there. 
The high rates of surplus value extracted from Africa and other third 
world countries did enable the transnationals to pay a strata of their employers 
wages much higher than those earned by most workers. 1his created an 'aristocracy 
of labor' wh~ch provided a veneer of le;r:timization and ~lleged labor support 
for transnational corporate activities!1 In the U.S., for example, the merged 
American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL~CIO), 
representing less than 25 percent of the paid labor force, has succeeded in 
,45 
raising the wages of some of its members well above the majority of workers 
who remain unorganized and tend to suffer higher rates of unemployment. 
Economic necessity coerced wives and daughters. of lower paid men -- especially 
minorities -- as well as single women into the labor force in greater numbers 
and 1970s . 46 
in the 1960s/than ever before in history. Barely m.ore than 10 percent of 
them were organized into unions, however, and their median wages actually 
47 
drripped from 63 percent of men's in the 1950s to .57 percent in the 1970s. 
One out of six Americans was reported to be livinp, below the voverty l~vel• 
by the end of the 1960s -- -and·- that proportion undoubtedly increased in 
the 1970s as prices and unemployment -rose rapidlv. 
But the AFL-CIO leaders -- mostly white. males allocate to themselves 
•. . . . 
sala.):'ies ' ranging over $100,000 a year, and are invited to participate with the 
-------
+The c~a.t1on of a 'labor arietonacy' 1• qual1tat1vel1 dif'ferent froa 
lll&lluel'a prpppaitien noted above in the footnote on P• 24. 
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transnational corporate captains of industry in international parleys relating 
48 
to world econamic policy. This may help to explain why the African-American 
Labor Council, established by the AFL-CIO in the m±d-1960s, supports U.S. 
49 
investment in South Africa's racist economy. 
. In South Africa, apartheid has legally enshrined white workers as a sub-
center 'labor aristocracy'. TI-le white workers' unions have aggressively sup-
ported the Nationalist Government's measures which have reserved to their members 
a monopoly of the highly paid skilled jobs with wages ten to fifteen time those 
· of the black working class. In the South African case, the top strata of this 
'aristocracy' has almost visibly merged with the management of the mines and 
50 
manufacturing industries. 
The continued accumulation and reinvestment of capital by the growing 
transnational cooperations was buoyed by several phenomena throughout the 1960s, 
which, despite the emergence of contradictions like those noted above, was 
preclaimed as an era of booming prosperity. The continually expanding sales 
of military c~odities, as the u.s. escalated the Vietnam war, ensured a 
guaranteed high-priced market for basic industries in the U.S. and, to a not 
insignificant extent, in Japan as well. Continued investment in new technologies 
like computers and nuclear power, as well as a range of · less spectacular but 
never-the-less important industrial innovations at home· contributed to t:xpanding 
the national and international market via multiplier effects. 
A vast. extension of national and international debt played a vital role 
in facilitating the continued accumulation and reinvestment of capital, des.pite 
51 
the contradictory developments it generated. The growth of international debt 
was accelerated by the rapid growth_ in the late 1960s of the Eurodollar 
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market, initiated when the biggest U.S. banks sought to escape the efforts 
of the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank to control national credit expansion, infla-
52 
tion, and balance of payments problems. Consortia of European banks quickly 
followed suit to protect their interests against U.S. financial corporate com- ~ 
53 
petition. By the 1970s, the 12 largest U.S. banks had become a permanent 
feature of the European money market, earning about half their incomes from 
54 
loans made outside of the United States itself. The Big Rockefeller Bank, 
Citicorp, .reported by 1975 that it had earned 70% of its · income from the half 
of its assets located abroad; its overseas earnings offset domestic losses 
55 
to give it record returns that year. 
·~~-------- · ·--· ··- --- - ·· ·····--··-· . 
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IV. The re-emergence of the general crisis of caoitalism 
The contradictions generated by the process of accumulation and rein-
vestment of surplus value in both the center and periphery nations inevitably 
culuminated in the series of crises that spread throughout the capitalist •; 
world in the 1970s. The end of the Vietnam War threatened a relative re-
duction of the lucrative military market. Balance of payments deficits 
spread among the core industrial countries as they found themselves unable 
to sell enough goods abroad to offset their massive purchases of raw materials 
and, increasingly, light consumer godds and even basic industrial materials 
produced by transnational affiliates in lower-cost sub-regional centers 
like South Africa. 
develoQed 
The western, or, more precisely,/capita1.ist (since they clearly included 
Japan and some 'third world') countries were gripped in a series of crises that 
in toto differed qualitatively from the recessions that had been experienced 
during the preceding quarter of a century. The international monetary crisis 
triggered off a series of devaluations among the core industrial countries which 
. 
finally led to a breakdown of the international monetary system established at 
Bretton Woods. The oil crisis pushed up the costs of oil and aggravated the 
balance of payments problems of both core and non-oil producing periphery countries. 
An all-encompassing economic depression, characterized simultaneously by infla-
tion and unemployment -- defying Kenyesian prescriptions -- spread from one 
core nation to the next. By the mid-1970s, the capitalist countries appeared 
to be engulfed in a general crisis which, while differinp, in several featur@s 
from that · of the '30s was nevertheless. equally severe. 
The cut back in industrial production in the center reduced demand for 
raw materials produced in the periphery. Worsened terms of trade and growinp, 
unemployment spread throughout Africa. Even in South Africa, despite the lack 
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of official data, it was reported that as many as one out of five blacks was 
56 
unemployed, and that whites were, for the first time, ' feeling the impact of 
57 
the crisis as industry cut back production to under: 70 percent of capacity. 
The transnational corporations and banks sought to throw the burden of 
the crisis on the working people hoth in the center and in the periphery. 
The Rockefeller-initiated * 58 Trilateral Commission published reports which 
argued, on the one hand, that the U.S., Europe and Japan "increasingly 
need the developing cotmtries as sources of raw materials, as export 
mark~ts, and, most important of all, as constructive partners in the creation 
of a workable world order." On the other hand, they . claimed that the advanced 
capitalist cotmtries were suffering from an 'excess of democracy' in which 
their working classes made too many demands for welfare and the right to 
participate in discussions relative to it. These two arguments, combined, 
seemed to provide the rationale for supporting continued and expanded invest-
' ment in sub-regional centers like South Africa, a policy which Carter espoused 
59 
from the outset of his term in office. 
Monetary institutions both at home and abroad are being used to coerce 
locai governments to impose austerity program!;, cutting back on employment 
and welfare programs. The experience of New York City, which is being reolicated 
on a less-publicized scale throughout 
1' \1 ,- ' . ,. , . 1 l°" (.I,,_. ''.C I'-' t::'>1-'i :~· C .:l\' , 'I: _~~'.~ j 
the u.s.,[is not di~similar from that of 
'third world' countries under pressures from the International Monetary Fund 
and the international banking conununity. Today, the biggest international 
* Which included a number of top corporate personnel as .well as 
President Carter and several individuals now holding high-ranking posts 
in his Administration.60 
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banks are pressin~ for the extension of IMF powers so that it can exert 
pressures on third world governments not only to implement policies to re-
cover monies loaned by the IMF itself, but also those advanced to them by 
private transnational banks. 
All these factors underscore the need for African states to c~rry through 
critical institutional changes and implement essential measures to break their 
dependence on the transnational corporations that dominate the political econ-
62 
omies of the capitalist world. Til.e current general crisis renders this nee-
essity even more urgent than before. Austerity and reduced government spending 
will simply aggravate unemployment and reduce the real levels of living of the 
masses of the populations. Devaluation, by augmenting the costs of imported 
goods on which their economies have become dependent, will stimulate inflation 
and slash real incomes further. Til.ese policies cannot eliminate the underlying 
contradictions inherent in the continued direct and increasing indirect ex-
traction of surplus value from African economies. 
What is needed is a fundartiental restructuring of the critical political-
economic institutions which govern the key sectors of African economies to 
facilitate capturing the investible surpluses produced by African labor. Til.e 
state, representing the wage workers and peasants, needs to gain effective 
control of the 'commanding heights' and begin to implement lon~-term industrial 
strategies. Physical and financial plans need to be coordinated to direct 
national investment to increasingly integrated, balanced national economic 
growth desip,ned to provide productive employment opportunities and rising 
standards of life for the people. 
In Southern Africa, the liberation movements, backed by the 'front line' 
states, have determined to wage armed struggle until they oust the white minority 
regimes and to open the way for complete political-economic reconstruction in 
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in the region. This will permit development of regional cooperation between 
liberated African states building on the industrial base established in 
South Africa, to create a modern industrial-agricultural regional economy 
63 
capable of transforming the lives of the rna.iority of the region's inhabitants. 
As the .African peoples seek to build new lives, they will undoubtedly 
continue to cement new alliances with the peoples of other third world and 
socialist nations. Already, a number of African countries have learned that 
socialist governments, despite disagreements and divisions between them, provide 
a valuable source of basic capital equipment and machinery for their expanding 
64 
industrial sectors. In the context of carefully worked out long-term nlans 
to restructure their political economies they may also be able, by taking_ 
advantage of competition among transnational corporations, to drive successful 
bargains for additional essential inputs. 
But the tmderlying strategy should remain one based on building the unity 
of the working classes, the wage earners and the peasants, together with corn-
mitted intellectuals, to implement planned development and integration of 
. 
Afrita's own vast resources on a regional and eventually a continental scale. 
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